We suggest that the activation model of identification benefits for repeated words and pseudowords proposed by Johnston, van Sariten, and Hale (1985) is a variant of our own code/episode model (Salasoo, ShifFrin, & Feustel, 1985) , used to explain the temporary and long-lasting effects of repetitions. In particular, Johnston et al.'s X and Y factors may reflect the operation of episodic memory traces and codification, respectively. Computational processing models, we believe, are useful because their precision helps clarify otherwise fuzzy theoretical distinctions.
and another term having all the attributes of an episodic memory component. Thus we suggest that the differences between the models are largely apparent, and the real differences are considerably outweighed by the similarities.
The Data
Although Johnston et al. (1985) raise many questions about the power of our (Salasoo et al., 1985) data, their concerns revolve around issues not relevant for our conclusions. In many cases, our data did not yield statistically significant differences; Johnston et al. suggest that these differences may actually have been present. For example, a year after the repetition training sessions, the psychometric curves for old words and old pseudowords did not differ statistically (Salasoo et al., 1985, Figure 10 ). Nevertheless, there may well have been a word advantage, because the data point at the highest frame time was higher for words (albeit not significantly so). We did not try to claim otherwise. The important point is that the difference, if it exists, is certainly small relative to the difference between new and old pseudowords. Other cases questioned by Johnston et al. (1985) are similar. Our conclusions do not require the acceptance of null hypotheses. Rather, the clear patterns of outcomes and the relative magnitudes of the effects are sufficient for us to make our points. Admittedly, there was one possible weakness in the results of Experiment 2 (Salasoo et al., 1985) that concerned us: the continued improvement in performance after convergence of words and pseudowords. Our concern with these data and with the possibility of ceiling effects motivated the tests at one year (Salasoo et al., 1985, Experiment 3) . These results showed that convergence was still present, even though performance had dropped back to initial levels for the words. To us this implied a long-lasting, qualitative change in the nature of the pseudoword representation (i.e., codification).
In contrast, Johnston et al. (1985) view these results as a failure to replicate the frequency effect in identification (p. 501). As support for this argument, they cite Solomon and Postman (1952) . Those investigators, like us, found that identification of pseudowords improved over short retention intervals. Because Solomon and Postman (1952) did not test at extended delays, their results are not in any way in conflict with our one-year data. The relationship between experimental repetitions and natural language frequency is of course interesting, but neither our data nor those of Solomon and Postman (1952) resolve this issue.
Still concerned with the one-year results, Johnston et al. (1985) assert that we claim that "episodic memory for pseudowords totally disappeared after one year" (p. 501). In fact, no such claim is made. What we have shown is that after one year repetition benefits for both words and pseudowords are no longer apparent. These results imply only that the contribution of episodes to 'identification is small after a long delay. Johnston et al. suggest that the proper test of episodic memory is a recall or recognition test (p. 501). In fact, we did find that the year-old pseudowords were recognized above chance (Experiment 3). We see no reason to assume that a failure of episodes to facilitate identification need be tied to recognition performance: Dissociations between recognition and identification performance as a function of repetitions are well-documented phenomena (e.g., Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) .
In any event, Johnston et al. (1985) are not serious about these objections, because in the end they do agree that a two-factor approach to the effects of repetitions is needed: one governing the growth of a permanent code, and one representing shortterm effects.
In the Salasoo et al. (1985) experiments, the rapid convergence of word and pseudoword performance, the improvement of performance within sessions, the decay between sessions, and the results at the one-year test all suggested the existence of two separate effects of repetitions for pseudowords. We attempted to label these two components neutrally, and adopted the term codification to describe the formation of a permanent lexical memory code. Codification accounts for qualitative, lasting changes in repeated pseudoword identification. In our account, the availability of a code enables rapid and accurate identification. We attributed the temporary improvements and losses observed for both words and pseudowords to episodic memory processes, following our own work (Feustel et al., 1983) and that of others (e.g., Jacoby, 1983) : To the extent that item and context information from a prior episodic memory trace are reinstated on a later presentation, repetition benefits identification. ' Johnston et al. (1985) try to identify the distinction between codification and episodic memory processes with "different memory systems." However, we attempted, with these labels, only to denote a distinction between two components of the identification process that differ in temporal persistence. Our twofactor code/episode computational model was designed to capture this distinction (see Salasoo et al., 1985, pp. 65-72 , for details).
Similarities Between the Models A review of Johnston et al.'s (1985) model reveals marked similarities with ours. In both models, letter representations are activated 1 Johnston, van Santen, & Hale (1985) assert that we have lumped the operation of the episodic traces into a single unit. As clarification, we point out that the episodic feedback to letters in our model was instantiated as a binomial expansion (Equations 8 and 9) of the sum of all prior episodes (from previous experimental trials), each one having decayed since the time it was laid down in memory. when a word is presented, and this activation in turn feeds forward to lexical codes in memory (or logogens in Johnston et al.'s version) . Similarly, in both accounts the differential improvements seen for repeated words and pseudowords in Experiment 2 of the Salasoo et al. (1985) article are due to a combination of both short-term and permanent effects of repetitions. Even the component processes responsible for the short-term and permanent effects are similar: The factors represented by Johnston et al.'s X and Y parameters serve the same general purpose as do episodic memory and codification in our model. In fact, the Y factor and codification are conceptually equivalent: Both are responsible for long-lasting qualitative changes in the identification of repeatedly presented pseudowords.
Although Johnston et al. (1985) apparently believe that their short-term parameter (X) represents short-term activation of logogens, we think that parameter X is more sensibly viewed as representing activation contributed or caused by stored episodes of prior presentations. We ask: Where does X arise, if not in episodic memory nodes? In Johnston et al.'s Model M, X rises with repetitions and falls with delay, independently of the current code strength (Y), and not closely related to the current activation of the logogen (Equation 6). One can imagine models in which the short-term factor would be characterized as a change in the base level of activation in a logogen, or a state of residual activation in a logogen, but neither of these approaches is adopted by Johnston et al. (1985) . The shortterm component represented by parameter X exists somewhere in the system at a level tied to the number and recency of presentations, and not to the current state of the logogen. This seems virtually to be a definition of an episodic effect. This is especially true when one considers the slow decay assigned to X: Usually, logogen activation is assumed to decay in several seconds (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984; Morton, 1979) . In summary, it seems safe to conclude that X represents activation contributed by episodic nodes. If Johnston et al. (1985) insist on calling Model M a "logogen-only" model, then we doubt it would be possible to make a sensible distinction between our two-factor code/episode model. and this expanded class of "logogen" models-the class of "logogen" models would have become large enough to include models with separate episodic memory nodes.
Differences Between the Models
Even though our model and Model M both represent two-factor code/episode models, they differ in some interesting ways. First, the growth of permanent codes is all-or-none in our model and gradual in Model M. At the present stage of development in this research area, we doubt that these two approaches can be distinguished. Second, we have assumed a slow initial growth in the probability of code formation with repetitions, whereas parameter Y in Model M grows geometrically (incorporating rapid initial growth). We chose our assumptions in order to allow the prediction of the roughly additive effect of lexicality and repetitions over the first few presentations in the continuous threshold latency identification task (CTLI) of Feustel et al. (1983) .
2 Finally (and most importantly), the models differ in the way in which the short-term factor manifests its facilitation. In the Johnston et al. (1985) model, codes (or logogens) are activated directly, whereas in our model, the episodes provide feedback to the letter level (which, then provides indirect facilitation of codes).
2 Johnston, van Santen, & Hale (1985) are concerned that the interaction of lexicality with repetitions seen in Experiment 2 of the Salasoo, Shiffrin, & Feustel (1985) study may be inconsistent with the data and theory of the Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo (1983) study. Their concern, we believe, is unwarranted. In Experiments 2 and 3 of the Feustel et al. (1983) study, a few repetitions facilitated identification time approximately equally for words and pseudowords. These data led us to postulate separable effects of repetitions and lexicality. However, in Experiment 1 of the same study, using two identification tasks that yield accuracy response measures, continuous threshold identification (CTI) and discrete threshold identification (DTI), we first reported a lexicality by repetitions interaction. The reason for the results of (approximate) additivity in the processing time measures on one hand, and the interaction in the accuracy measures on the other, relates to differences in error probabilities in the two kinds of tasks. The convergence result in the Salasoo et al. (1985) study and our code/episode model are consistent with this explanation (see Feustel et al., 1983, pp. 340-341) .
Although the direct activation approach may be somewhat simpler, we prefer the letter-level facilitation approach for several reasons. First, the word superiority effect is probably handled most effectively by assuming activation of letters from word codes (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) .
Second, positive priming of both words and pseudowords occurs when an orthographically similar item is presented (Feustel el al., 1983 ). For a model like M to explain orthographic priming of words (e.g., from THIGH to HIGH and vice versa), it would be necessary to assume that the prime presentation partially raises the X factor for all similar words. Perhaps this assumption is sensible, but it is hard to see how this kind of model could handle the even larger priming effect for pseudowords (e.g., from THISH to HISH and vice versa). It would be necessary to assume that the presentation of a pseudoword not only begins to produce a logogen for that item, but also for all similar pseudowords. This strikes us as a dubious and farfetched form of logogen model. Such results can be handled within our model by the feedback from episodic nodes to letters.
Third, only a minimal facilitation of word repetitions occurs across the auditory and visual modalities (Clarke & Morton, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) , except when subjects are required to spell aloud the spoken words and hence are made aware of their letter-level structure. In this latter situation, substantial facilitation in identification of a later visual presentation of the spoken word is observed (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982 ). Although our model does not explicitly account for these data, these findings do suggest that the letter level of processing is involved in improvements with repetitions.
Fourth, and finally, we have collected relevant data (as yet unpublished, so of course Johnston et al., 1985 , could not have taken them into account) using the CTLI task. We found that the improvements with repetitions for the first few presentations of random strings of consonants or digits were as large as those for words and pseudowords. In several experiments, equally large improvements for a variety of stimuli were observed, regardless of properties such as meaning, pronounceability, response integration, and familiarity. This suggests to us not only that feedback occurs to the component level, but also that the source of activation is stored in episodic memory nodes. Within a model framework like that of Johnston et al. (1985) , one could handle such a result by assuming a rate of logogen formation that does not vary with the nature of the stimuli presented. However, Johnston et al.'s reference to M. Treisman (1978) suggests that this assumption would not be in the spirit of their approach. (Treisman proposes that a letter string sends activation to a potential node in spelling space, thereby relating the rate of codification or logogen growth to spelling and pronunciation properties of novel letter strings.)
Conclusions
In summary, we regard the Johnston et al. (1985) model as another form of a two-factor approach involving episodic nodes and permanent codes in memory. The model differs from ours in several ways, chiefly in the manner in which the short-term activation is assumed to have its effect. For the reasons given in this reply, we prefer our assumption of feedback from the episodic nodes to the letter level, but further research on this point would be useful. We should emphasize that the fact that Johnston et al.'s (1985) model is so similar to our two-factor approach does not mean that some other single-factor model could not be found to fit our data. We welcome such further modeling attempts and further empirical tests to distinguish among them. Finally, we wish to commend Johnston et al. (1985) on the formulation of an interesting alternative model. Contrary to their own views, the implementation of both our model and theirs as explicit computer simulation programs has already led to considerable theoretical advances: Many concepts and assumptions that would otherwise have remained vague, misunderstood, or ignored have been clarified and made concrete. For such reasons, we suspect that much of the future theoretical progress in word and pseudoword identification research will be tied to formal modeling.
